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Kenneth Hillas of Penobscot is a retired senior foreign service officer and a recently retired member of the faculty of the University of Maine’s Graduate School of Policy and International Affairs.
In what was clearly an act of war, on Jan. 3 the U.S. bombed Venezuela and a Delta Force team captured and removed Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro to the U.S. Receiving less attention is that the Trump administration failed to comply with the congressional notification requirements of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, as well as other legal requirements concerning significant intelligence operations. Moreover, Democratic members of Congress claim Secretary of State Marco Rubio denied that regime change was the administration’s goal in its military build up in the Caribbean Sea.
Putting aside the lack of an authorization by the United Nations Security Council or by a regional organization, such as the Organization of American States, the prospect of intervention’s success — whatever the Trump administration’s definition — is very much in question. The oppressive regime Maduro headed remains in place; its organic ties to drug cartels continue; and its heavy reliance on Cuban intelligence and security services remains strong. Maduro’s personal security detail was composed of Cuban personnel, 32 of whom were killed in the Jan. 3 raid.
The administration has batted around various reasons for the military pressure campaign over the last several months, starting with stopping the flow of fentanyl into the U.S., when in fact Venezuela is not a source of fentanyl. Rather, most of it comes from Mexico.
The other purpose cited by the Trump administration, although less frequently, was to restore democracy. But on the day of the intervention President Donald Trump rejected the idea that the widely recognized winner of the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election, Edmundo Gonzalez, or the leader of democratic opposition, Corinna Machado, might replace Maduro. Machado’s cardinal sin being that she accepted the Nobel Peace Prize that President Donald Trump believes he deserves. The U.S. administration, instead, prefers to work out a deal with Maduro’s vice president and now interim president, Delcy Rodriguez.
Trump has focused on restoring the role of major U.S. oil firms in Venezuela. Chevron is the only one remaining. Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves in the world, but its production has declined significantly in the last two decades, suffering from aging infrastructure and lack of investment because of sanctions. But oil is a fungible commodity and increased access to Venezuelan oil is of limited value.
The actual purpose of the U.S. intervention can be found in the recently released U.S. National Security Strategy: to reestablish U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. The strategy went so far as to assert a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine of the early 19th century that had been aimed at excluding the return of European former colonial powers to the Western Hemisphere. Trump’s corollary is similar to the vision of Teddy Roosevelt that saw the U.S. as the dominant power in the region. A measure of success for the administration will be a shift in Venezuela’s close economic and security ties with Iran, Russia, China and Cuba.
Of course, that won’t happen quickly, if at all. Trump is counting on the threat of further military action to achieve Rodriguez’s acquiescence. However, she and her brother (who is president of the National Assembly) have proven skillful in past negotiations on elections in promising one thing and doing another. Expect Rodriguez to play for time.
While every U.S. president has had reservations about the constitutionality of the 1973 War Powers Act, the courts have refrained from overturning the law. Nevertheless, every president has complied with the requirement of consulting with Congress in advance when U.S. forces are to be deployed into a situation where conflict is expected. By contrast, the Trump administration failed to do so, although Rubio spoke with at least one Republican member of Congress after the initiation of the operation. None of the majority or minority leadership in Congress and none of the chairs of either chamber’s committees on foreign affairs, defense or intelligence (this was also an intelligence operation) received advance notification.
This is a departure from the practice of past presidents.
Trump’s initial actions in Venezuela carry significant risks of failure for the U.S. or the need for further military action. Absent efforts to uphold Congress’s oversight authority and constitutional role in deciding questions of war and peace, the Venezuela operation may represent a further decline in congressional authority and further strengthen presidential power, which are already extensive in regard to foreign affairs. These questions are certain to become more acute as the situation in Venezuela evolves.
